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I. INTRODUCTION
The proposed horizontal merger of two major corporate entities that compete
in the same relevant product and geographic markets, within the jurisdiction of
either the United States or the European Union, would possibly bring forth a chal-
lenge from the respective enforcement agencies of both political entities. To avoid
a successful challenge to a proposed merger, the parties presenting the merger for
premerger notification should have a clear understanding of the policies and
enforcement tactics used by the agencies involved in the evaluation and approval
of horizontal mergers. A comparison of United States and European Union
merger law reveals a relatively similar approach with regard to the factors
considered in the premerger notification process. In light of the standards that
each agency uses to gauge the effect on competition within the relevant markets,
approval can be heavily dependent upon how the merging parties' counsel
develops the facts and the arguments supporting those facts.
The following material provides a detailed analysis comparing United States
and European Union (E.U.) horizontal merger policy. Part II highlights various
structural and technical differences between U.S. and E.U. enforcement agencies.'
Part III provides analysis of the merger policies of the two by reviewing the
decision of the Commission of the European Communities to "declare
incompatible," and thus under E.U. law prohibit the acquisition of de Havilland
by a joint venture group controlled directly by Aerospatiale and Alenia. The
challenge by the Commission will be reviewed by analyzing the Commission's
reasoning and use of the relevant E.U. provisions relating to merger control.3 The
E.U. Commission's facts and areas of analysis will be compared and contrasted
to U.S. policy, through the 1992 Revised Merger Guidelines,' issued jointly by
the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. After extensive
analysis, Part IV closes the comparison by summarizing the main areas of
similarity and difference between E.U. and U.S. horizontal merger policy.
II. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION AGENCIES
A. Federal Versus Independent State Enforcement
Merger enforcement in the United States and the European Union occurs on
both a federal or Union wide level, and at the independent state or member State
1. See infra notes 5-66 and accompanying text.
2. Official Journal of the European Communities, 1991 OJ. (L 334) 5. See infra notes 67-256 and
accompanying text.
3. 1990 O.J. (L 257) and 1990 O.J. (L 219). Both Regulations entered into force on Sept. 21, 1990.
4. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Statement Accompanying Release of
Revised Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 (1992).
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level.5 In the United States on the state level, merger control and enforcement is
usually headed by the various states' Attorneys General. Most individual U.S.
states have a limited amount of resources to commit to merger enforcement.
However, with the decline in antitrust enforcement at the federal level during the
1980s, the Attorneys General have stepped in to become an important factor in
antitrust enforcement in the United States. In 1993, the National Association of
Attorneys General adopted a set of uniform horizontal merger guidelines.6 The
merger provisions are similar to, but separate from, the federal provisions in a
number of conceptual areas. In California v. American Stores Co..' the United
States Supreme Court allowed state Attorneys General to petition for divestiture
as a form of "injunctive relief' in postmerger remedy cases.8 In addition, the
Supreme Court directly granted to the District Court the authdrity to order
divestiture in appropriate cases brought under Section 16 of the Clayton Act!
Therefore, an approval of a proposed international horizontal merger in the
United States by federal agencies responsible for merger regulation does not
preclude independent state action.'
Failing to take account of the antitrust concerns of state attorneys general
puts merger transactions at unplanned risk of being undone, after valuable
time, effort and money have been expended putting the deal together.
Consulting state attorneys general in all instances allows firms to assess this
risk, and in many cases, fully alleviate it."
5. For example, in the United States, state refers to states such as Connecticut, New York and
California; whereas for the European Union, member state refers to Spain, France or Germany.
6. 256 TRADE REG. REP. Supp. (CCH) Mar. 30, 1993.
7. 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
8. Id. at 296.
9. Id.
10. John D. Briggs et al., Progransfrom the 40th Annual Spring Meeting: Report From Officialdom:
60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer, Chairman of the National Association of Attorneys General Multistate
Antitrust Task Force, 61 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 211, 222 (1992). Robert M. Langer, recent Chairman of the
National Association of Attorneys General Multistate Antitrust Task Force, stated in response to a question
concerning state involvement in international merger matters,
We look at companies involved in international operations where we feel there is
sufficient local interest that we ought to have a part to play. Now, the fact is, if you have
EC approval or Canadian approval and FTC or DOJ involvement, and we believe we
have something to say, if we are reasonably comforted by the level of scrutiny attached
to the transaction by federal officials, it is unlikely that we are going to reinvent the
wheel and start looking at international transactions with our limited resources. I don't
discount the possibility on an ad hoc basis, but it is not going to be our primary focus.
Id.
11. See Richard Blumenthal et al., Antitrust Review of Mergers by State Attorneys General: The New
Cops On the Beat, 67 CONN. B.J. 1, 14 (1993).
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Although this paper analyzes merger regulation exclusively on the federal level,
prudent counsel should be prepared to follow independent state premerger noti-
fication procedures for any state in which the merger might have a significant
intrastate impact.1
2
In the European Union, merger enforcement authority is divided more clearly
along Union and independent member state lines. The proposed merger either
falls above or below the threshold defined in Article 2 of E.U. Regulation
4064/89.13 If the merging entities are small in size or affect only a limited section
of the Union, falling below the criteria necessary to have "Community dimen-
sion," then the merger is outside the jurisdiction of the Commission and can be
referred to the discretion of independent Member State's agencies for assessment
and enforcement.14 Individual states within the European Union vary widely in
their regulations and enforcement policies from complex and restrictive in
Germany to a somewhat more relaxed governmental posture within Italy. How-
ever, once a merger is found to have Community dimension, the merger falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the E.U. Commission'5 and member states are
precluded from taking separate action against the merging entities.' 6 In addition,
individual member states may refer certain proposed mergers to the Commission
for advice and a ruling on the compatibility of the concentration with the Union.'"
For the purposes of this paper, however, the focus will be solely upon horizontal
merger enforcement that would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the E.U.
12. The burden of meeting differing evidentiary standards with regard to separate state premerger
notification has been greatly reduced through the adoption by the National Association of Attorneys General
of the "NAAG Voluntary Premerger Disclosure Compact," [hereinafter Compact]. 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
Mar. 30, 1994, at §13410. The Compact provides that "any party to any proposed merger subject to the filing
requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 18a, may voluntarily file a photocopy of the first filing with the 'liaison state'
member of the Compact." Id. When properly filed,
the parties to the Compact agree to serve no other or further investigative subpoena,
Civil Investigative Demands or other compulsory pre-complaint demands for disclosure
upon the merging party that makes the voluntary filing specified in the Second Proviso
during the pendency of the Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting period... provided, however,
that the merging parties additionally and contemporaneously file with the liaison state
a single photocopy of any other materials that may be supplied to the federal
enforcement agencies.
Id. The Compact serves to coordinate the efforts of the signatory states and the federal agencies to alleviate
the burden on the merging parties to satisfy evidentiary requests and at the same time to provide a common
set of data from which different agencies can conduct a postmerger impact analysis.
13. 1990 OJ. (L 257) at art. 1(2). For the purposes of this Regulation, a concentration has a community
dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more
than ECU 5000 million; and (b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves
more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same member state. Id.
14. See id. § 29 and art. 9.
15. Id. art. 21(1).
16. Id. art. 21(2); see id. art. 21(3) (allowing member states to take appropriate measures to protect
legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and compatible with the general
principles and other provisions of Community law).
17. Id. art. 22(3). See also id. art. 9(2) (stating that a member state may apprise the commission that a
concentration threatens to create or strengthen a dominant position).
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Commission or that which would be assessed at the federal level in the United
States.
B. Agencies
The United States maintains two agencies at the federal level that are primarily
responsible for merger enforcement. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) assess, and approve or challenge, a proposed
horizontal merger. The agencies are separate organizations. However, in 1992,
the DOJ and FTC issued a joint statement setting forth common criteria by which
both agencies would evaluate horizontal mergers.18 For the first time with the
1992 Revised Merger Guidelines, 9 the DOJ and FTC began to follow the same
standards in evaluating the anticompetitive effects of a proposed horizontal
merger on competition within a relevant market.
The DOJ is an agency of the federal government headed by the Attorney
General of the United States. The antitrust division of the DOJ is responsible for
enforcing the Sherman Act,20 and jointly with the FTC, the Clayton Act.2' The
antitrust division of the DOJ, under an Assistant Attorney General, has the
authority to investigate and prosecute mergers that are determined to be anti-
competitive.2 Even if assessed as anticompetitive under the standards set forth
in the Guidelines,' the DOJ does not have the authority to prohibit the proposed
merger.24 To challenge a merger the DOJ has standing in federal district court to
bring a civil action for a violation of either Section 1 of the Sherman Act or
Section 7 of the Clayton Act2 When the DOJ brings an action, the court may
issue a permanent injunction against the merging parties under Section 15 of the
Clayton Act.
26
The FTC is an independent regulatory agency created by the Federal Trade
Commission Act27 that has the authority to enforce the Clayton Act 8 as it relates
to mergers and other antitrust matters. The FTC differs from the DOJ in that the
FTC has the authority to investigate, prosecute, and most importantly adjudicate
applications for merger approval. 9 The Office of Administrative Law Judges?0
18. See supra note 3.
19. Id. See Statement Accompanying Release: Of Revised Merger Guidelines, April 2, 1992, in MILTON
HANDLER, ETAL, CASES & MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 104-06 (3d. ed. Supp. 1992).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1992).
21. Id. §§ 12-27 (1992).
22. J. WILLIAM ROWLEY & DONALD . BAKER, INTERNATIONAL MERGERS THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 464
(1991).
23. See supra note 3.
24. RowLEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 464.
25. Jurisdiction is conferred to the Federal District Court by Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1992) and Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1992).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1992).
27. Id. §§ 41-51 (1992).
28. See id. §§ 18-18A (1992).
29. ROwLEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 464.
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adjudicates the approval or denial of prenotification merger applications?' The
final decision of an administrative law judge may be appealed to the full Com-
mission for review, then to the Federal Court of Appeals, and finally to the United
States Supreme Court.32 However, as a practical matter most mergers that are
rejected by the FFC at the administrative level can usually be restructured through
divestiture of the problematic areas of the merger to avoid further proceedings.
33
Under European Union law, mergers are referred to as "concentrations between
undertakings. '' The sole agency charged with the authority to evaluate and
approve or deny proposed concentrations on the Union level is the Commission
of the European Communities (Commission). The Commission has the authority
to investigate, prosecute, and fully adjudicate all matters relating to mergers under
The Merger Regulation 4064/89.?' Like the FTC, the Commission can block a
proposed concentration as incompatible with the Union. However, a final ruling
by the Commission challenging a proposed merger as incompatible with the
Union can ultimately be appealed to the European Court of Justice?
6
C. Premerger Notification Requirements
The requirements for premerger notification are similar in both the United
States and the European Union. Informal contact with the respective agencies is
available in both jurisdictions to the merging parties prior to the submission of the
required premerger notification application?7 In the United States, antitrust
enforcement of horizontal merger policy often occurs in the practitioner's office,
well before premerger notification is submitted to either the DOJ or the FTC.
Valuable consultation can begin with informal communication between the
merging parties and the attorney handling the merger. Preliminary discussions
between the respective parties allow for the formulation of specific issues that
might raise antitrust concerns during the agency analysis of the proposed merger.
Knowing the areas of potential conflict in advance allows the merging parties to
(1) directly address the problem areas and (2) to provide valid justifications with
the application form or to restructure the deal before submission to the agencies
for approval.
The Commission also accepts direct informal communication from parties prior
to the filing of the required premerger notification form. 8 The Commission will
30. Id. at 465.
31. Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 45(g)(4).
33. RoWLEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 489-90.
34. 1990 O.J. (L 257).
35. Id.
36. Id. art. 21(1). The European Court of Justice consists of 13 judges and 6 advocates general, all
appointed through unanimous decision of the governments of the member states for a renewable term of 6
years. Id. Half are either replaced or reappointed every 3 years. Id.
37. ROWLEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 489.
38. Id. at 45, 48.
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issue a comfort letter to provide support to the proposed transaction if it views the
merger as "compatible" with the Union.39 However, even if the merger is
acceptable to the Commission and a comfort letter is issued, Article 4 of the Mer-
ger Regulation requires that the merging entities still file an official notice
regarding the intent to form a concentration between undertakings within the
Union.'"
In the United States, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act4
added Section 7A to the Clayton Act.4' Notification must be officially filed with
both the FTC and the DOJ. The document required is the Premerger Notification
Form.43 The form covers information regarding: (1) a description of the trans-
action, the parties and the parties' businesses; (2) information to determine the
horizontal overlap of competitive products and prior acquisitions with regard to
the areas of overlap; (3) vertical relationships between the parties; and (4)
financial reports, the merger agreement or letter of intent, and notification of other
contracts between the parties. 4
Once the form has been received by the agencies, the FTC and DOJ have thirty
days in which to file a response, or fifteen if the controlling party is making a
cash tender offer.4s If the merger facially raises substantial antitrust issues, the
agencies will make a Second Request for more information.46 The DOJ and the
FIC individually or concurrently perform the majority of the antitrust analysis
concerning problematic mergers by using the information provided through the
Second Request.47 Even though a Second Request for information occurs in less
than five percent of all mergers submitted to the agencies, the requests are almost
always extremely costly and require a substantial amount of resources in order to
respond.48 "It is not unusual for parties to submit hundreds of boxes of documents
in response to a Second Request." 9
The Commission Regulation 4064/89 requires that all concentrations between
undertakings that have a Union dimension notify the Commission not more than
one week after the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public
bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest," before the merger of the entities
involved. Community dimension is defined in Article 1 of the Merger
39. Id. at 48.
40. 1990 OJ. (L.257) at art. 4.
41. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390 (1976).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 18A (1992) (providing that "[n]o person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, any
voting securities or assets of any other person, unless both persons (or in the case of a tender offer, the
acquiring person) file notification").
43. Forms may be obtained from each respective agency.
44. RowiLEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 484.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 18A(b)(1)(B) (1992).
46. ROWLEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 485.
47. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
48. Row.EY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 485.
49. Id.
50. 1990 OJ. (L 257) at art. 14(1).
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 7
Regulation. 51 An exemption from notification exists if each of the undertakings
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Union-wide turnover
within a single member state.52 Turnover within the Union, or within a single
member state, is calculated by adding the value of the products sold and services
provided to separate undertakings or consumers.53 The' aggregate turnover speci-
fically includes all amounts derived by the undertakings concerned in the
preceding financial year from the sale of products and the provision of services
falling within the undertakings' ordinary activities after deduction of sales
rebates, value added tax, and other taxes directly related to turnover.' The cal-
culation of the aggregate turnover includes both the sum of the respective turn-
over of the undertaking concerned, and those undertakings in which the under-
taking concerned, either directly or indirectly, owns half of the capital or business
assets, or has the power to exercise fifty-one percent of the voting rights, appoint
fifty-one percent of the directors of the board, or directly manage the
undertakings' affairs.55
When a merger falls within the parameters of having a Union dimension, the
undertakings involved must file a premerger notification form, called a Form CO,
with the Commission. 56 This form must be filed within one week following either
the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the
acquisition of a controlling interest in the undertaking concerned. 57 The Form CO
filed with the Commission requires: information regarding the parties involved;
details of the concentration (including turnover estimates); a list of all
undertakings owned or controlled by the undertakings involved; a list of key
persons controlling over ten percent of stock or director decisions within the
entities; information on relevant affected product and geographic markets; general
conditions in affected markets; an estimate of the affects on the intermediate and
ultimate consumers; and significant economic or technological benefits from the
merger.58 The parties sign a declaration at the end of the Form CO certifying the
information provided. 59 The parties then.become subject to the assessment of
fines under Article 14 of regulation 4064/89 of up to ECU 50,000 if they
intentionally or negligently supply misleading or incorrect information.O
51. Id. art. 1(2).
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 5(l).
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 5(4).
56. 1990 O.J. (L 219) 6, Commission Regulation 2367/90, Annex 1, Form CO, § 1, art. 2[hereinafter
Form CO] (relating to the notification of a concentration).
57. 1990 O.. (L 257) 14, art. 4(1).
58. Id. at (2) - (7). For example, benefits would include market entry, vertical integration, distribution
and service systems, competitive environment, cooperative agreements, trade associations, worldwide context
of agreement. Id.
59. Id. at (8).
60. Id art. 14(l)(b). This fine is subject to full review by the European Court of Justice which has un-
limited jurisdiction to review decisions where the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment
schedule. Id. The Court of Justice may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payments
300
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Through the information provided on the Form CO, the Commission will
decide within three weeks following notification whether or not the proposed
merger poses significant antitrust concerns within the European Union.6 If the
Commission views the concentration as posing significant antitrust concerns,
then the Commission may decide upon preliminary investigation of the notifi-
cation to suspend the concentration and begin with full proceedings to assess the
concentration's compatibility with the Union62 The Commission may take one
month from the date of the initiation of proceedings to reach a final decision,
unless a request is put in by a member state; if this occurs, then the period may
be extended up to a maximum of six weeks.
63
The following section analyzes a case with a Union dimension that raised
significant anticompetitive concerns within the European Union. After the initial
review of the preliminary notification by the merging parties, the Commission
decided to continue the suspension of the concentration pursuant to Article 7(2)
of the Merger Regulation, and on June 12, 1991 the Commission initiated full
proceedings.6' Ultimately, after an in-depth analysis applying the guidelines set
forth in Article 2 of the Merger Regulation,65 the Commission declared the con-
centration of Aerospatiale and Alenia with de Havilland incompatible with the
common market.66 Thus, like the FTC with its adjudicative powers, the E.U.
Commission permanently enjoined the merging entities from proceeding with the
merger.
H. CASE IV/M. 053-AEROSPATIALE-ALENIA/DE HAVILLAND
On October 2, 1991, the Commission of the European Communities, acting
under the authority of the Merger Regulation 4064/89,67 declared the proposed
concentration of Aerospatiale S.N.I. (Aerospatiale) and Alenia-Aeritalia e Selenia
S.p.A. (Alenia) with the de Havilland division (de Havilland) of the Boeing
Company, incompatible with the common market.' The proposed transaction was
the joint acquisition by Aerospatiale and Alenia of the assets of de Havilland.
imposed. Id. art. 16.
61. Id. art. 7(1).
62. Id. art. 6(l)(c).
63. Id art. 10(1). The increase to six weeks would occur if a member state, pursuant to Article 9(2),
were to inform the Commission, which would in turn inform the undertakings concerned, that the concentration
threatened to create or to strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be
significantly impeded in a market, within that member state, which had all of the characteristics of a distinct
market. See id. art. 9(2). It is also important to note the exact explanation of the process of calculating the
beginning and ending days for the time period in which the Commission's proceeding will run. The Report of
the Commission Implementing Regulation 2367/90 of July 25, 1990, explains the time periods in full detail.
19900.J. (L 219) 6.
64. 1991 OJ. (L 334) at § 1 (2).
65. 1990 OJ. (L 257).
66. 1991 OJ. (L 334) at § V. art. 1.
67. 1990 OJ. (L 257).
68. 1991 OJ. (L 334).
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Pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Merger Regulation, 6the Commission extended the
suspension of the concentration past the three week premerger notification period.
On June 12, 1991, the Commission decided that the proposed concentration, after
preliminary review, raised serious doubts as to the compatibility with the Union."
Thus, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the
Merger Regulation.7'
The acquiring corporations, Aerospatiale, a French company, and Alenia, an
Italian company, were active in the aerospace industries. Both maintained product
lines in civil and military aircraft, helicopters, missiles, satellites, space systems,
avionics and maritime traffic control systems. The industry at issue in the case
was the regional transport aircraft industry.72 In 1982, Aerospatiale and Alenia
formed the Groupement d'Interet Economique Avions de Transport Regional
(ATR) to design, develop, manufacture and sell regional transport aircraft.73 At
the time of the proposed merger with de Havilland, the joint venture group ATR
had two regional turbo-prop aircraft on the market!4 ATR, controlled by
Aerospatiale and Alenia, was to obtain the assets of de Havilland, a subsidiary of
Boeing, and thereby gain control over the operations of de Havilland, which was
engaged solely in the manufacture of regional transport aircraft!5 De Havilland
at the time of the proposed merger sold two competing regional turbo-prop
aircraft in the regional transport aircraft market! 6
A. Jurisdiction
Currently, there does not exist an international agreement between the United
States and the European Union concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over
international mergers that have an anticompetitive effect in both United States and
European Union markets. The concept of exclusive jurisdiction over a proposed
merger has been debated;77 however, to date the United States and European
Union have failed to reach an agreement suitable to both parties.
An agreement that would allow a corporation the privilege to choose the forum
in which to have an international merger analyzed would greatly reduce the
administrative costs of merger approval. However, the strongest argument against
69. Id.
70. See 1990 OJ. (L257).
71. Id.
72. 1991 OJ. (L 334) at § 1V(8).
73. Id. § 1(3).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 1(4).
76. Id.
77. ROWLEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 9 n.5 (discussing speeches by Sir Leon Brittain, Commission
for Competition in the European Union, given in Cambridge at the Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures on
Feb. 8, 1990 and to the E.E.C. Chamber of Commerce in New York on Mar. 26, 1990, recommending that the
European Union and United States sign a treaty or detailed agreement regarding competition cases with a
common jurisdictional interest for both states).
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an exclusive jurisdiction agreement rests with the fact that if the United States
were to yield jurisdiction, the E.U. Commission would ultimately pass judgment
regarding the impact and suitability of a merger affecting United States markets.
Conversely, if the European Union yielded jurisdiction, the United States would
decide whether a merger was anticompetitive with regard to E.U. markets.
Assuming that the choice of law issues over which standards to apply when a
merger spanned both jurisdictions could be worked out, and with due respect to
the expertise and professional competence of the regulatory agencies enforcing
the standards, the practical matter is that both sovereign entities are reluctant to
allow a foreign authority, without a vested interest in the ultimate economic well-
being of the target state, to decide antitrust questions which ultimately could have
serious economic consequences within its borders. An analysis of E.U./U.S.
jurisdiction, therefore, begins with~a separate look at the jurisdictional procedure
followed by each of the respective enforcement agencies.
The Commission begins each case with an appraisal of its own jurisdiction over
the proposed merger.78 A proposed concentration must pass a two part test under
the Merger Regulation 4064/89 for the Commission to have jurisdiction. First, the
proposed merger must be a concentration in a form recognized by Article 3 of the
Merger Regulation and second, the merger must have a Union dimension under
Article 1. Article 3 defines a concentration as either (a) where two or more
previously independent undertakings merge, or (b) where one or more persons
already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings acquire,
whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means,
direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one. or more other
undertakings. 9 In the case of de Havilland, the merger came within the meaning
of Article 3(b) due to the fact that Aerospatiale and Alenia would acquire direct
control over de Havilland through the purchase of de Havilland's assets and
would then acquire indirect control through the operational control exercised by
thejoint venture entity ATR over de Havilland once de Havilland's assets were
purchased. 0
The merger met the second requirement of having a Union dimension based on
the fact that: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the parties
exceeded ECU 5 billion,"' and; (b) the aggregate Union-wide turnover of at least
two of the entities involved was greater than ECU 250 million. 2 The
undertakings concerned did not achieve more than two-thirds of their Union-wide
turnover within a single member state, and thus, did not fit under the singular
exemption to the Union dimension standard.83 Therefore, the proposed
78. 1990 OJ. (L 257) at art 1.
79. Id. art. 3(1)(a)-(b).
80. 1991 OJ. (L 334) at § 11(5).
81. Aerospatiale (ECU 4.7 billion), Alenia (member of the Finmeccanica group, ECU 5.2 billion) and
de Havilland (ECU 0.5 billion) provided a sum total ECU 10.4 billion. Id. § 111(6).
82. Both Aerospatiale and Alenia exceeded Community-wide turnover of ECU 250 million. Id.
83. Id.
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concentration had Union dimension as defined by Article 1 of the Merger
Regulation 4064/89, and the Commission maintained exclusive jurisdiction to
assess the compatibility of the concentration with the common market24
Article 2 of the Merger Regulation 4064/89, describes the factors which the
Commission will take into account to assess the compatibility of a proposed con-
centration with the common market.85 When appraising the compatibility of a
proposed merger with the market, the Commission under Article 2 will analyze
the following: the structure of all relevant markets, the actual or potential com-
petition from competitors within or outside of the European Union, the market
position and economic and financial power of the undertakings merging,
alternatives available to suppliers and users, access to supplies or markets, legal
or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and
services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the
development of technical and economic progress viewed in light of both a con-
sumer advantage and as an obstacle to competition. 6
Once the Commission has established that the concentration falls within its
exclusive jurisdiction, the vast majority of the decision is then dedicated to the
analysis of all of the factors listed in Article 2.87 The Commission analyzes
information supplied on the Form CO submitted by the merging entities. During
this analysis, the Commission remains in direct contact with the parties forming
the concentration to request further information necessary for clarification or
expansion of the initial review.88 Ultimately, a concentration will be declared
incompatible with the common market only if it creates or strengthens a dominant
position89 that would significantly impede effective competition in either the
common market or in a substantial part of it?' In the majority of cases, where a
significant portion of the merger poses no anticompetitive threat to the market, the
Commission is likely to declare a concentration compatible to the market, subject
to a "f'x-it-first" provision.9 The "fix-it-first" settlement requires certain changes
in the structure of the merger before the concentration is finalized?2
In the United States, the DOJ and the FTC maintain an enforcement policy over
horizontal mergers that violate either Section 7 of the Clayton Act,93 Section 1 of
the Sherman Act,94 or Section 5 of the FTC Act.9' The three acts provide different
standards under which either the DOJ will bring suit in federal court or the FTC
84. Id.
85. 1990 OJ. (L 257) 14, art. 2.
86. Id. art. 2(l)(a)-(b).
87. Id., see 1991 O.J. (L 334) at § IV(7)-(7 1).
88. See ROWLEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 45.
89. 1990 OJ. (L 257) at art. 2(3). Market power could lead to a monopoly. Id.
90. Id.
91. ROWLEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 48-49.
92. 1990 OJ. (L 257) at arts. 8(2) & 10(2).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1992).
94. Id. § 1.
95. Id. § 45.
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will adjudicate a merger. Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, mergers are
prohibited if their effect may be to substantially lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly. Mergers subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act are pro-
hibited if they constitute a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade.97 Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits mergers if they constitute an unfair
method of competition. 8
The 1992 Revised Merger Guidelines (Guidelines)" focus upon the standards
that will be used by the FTC and DOJ to evaluate proposed horizontal mergers.
The Guidelines articulate the analytical framework the agencies apply in
determining whether a merger is likely to substantially lessen competition. The
unifying theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create
or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise." Market power is defined
in the Guidelines as the ability of the seller to profitably maintain prices above
competitive levels for a significant period of time."' Here, the fundamental
objectives of the merger policy of the United States and the E.U. come together.
The E.U. Commission's efforts are focused upon the maintenance of effective
levels of competition within the common market through the rejection of the
creation or maintenance of a dominant position. The DOJ and FTC are similarly
focused upon ensuring effective competition by rejecting mergers that
significantly enhance the market power of the merging firms. The phrases
"dominant position" and "market power" are both ways of stating a policy
commitment against the establishment or use of monopoly power by a firm in a
relevant market.
B. Relevant Product and Geographic Market
The definition of the "relevant market" in terms of the geographic and product
markets is the single most important factor in merger analysis. The inclusion or
exclusion of a certain market area or a line of products can fundamentally affect
the analysis of the market share of the undertakings concerned. A broad or narrow
market definition would ultimately change the final percentage projections of con-
trol the merged entity would exercise in the relevant market, and this percentage
calculation could directly affect whether a proposed merger is approved or
rejected. The standards and framework for analysis of E.U. and U.S. product
market will be compared,"° followed by the standards for the analysis of the
geographic market. 3
96. Id. § 8.
97. Id. § 1.
98. Id. § 18.
99. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 (1992).
100. Id. § 0.1.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 130-146 and accompanying text.
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The Commission defines the relevant product and geographic market in Section
5 of the required premerger notification Form CO entitled "Information on
Affected Markets."" The relevant product market is defined as the market that,
"comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' char-
acteristics, their prices, and their intended use."'"5 In de Havilland the Com-
mission defined the relevant product markets affected by the proposed con-
centration as the markets for regional turbo-prop aircraft.'
6
The Commission distinguished the turbo-prop aircraft product market from the
regional jet aircraft product market on the ground of the competing products'
price and flight characteristics. ° Although a regional jet aircraft might compete
on the same flight routes that a regional turbo-prop aircraft would fly, the
acquisition and operating costs of the jet aircraft were significantly higher. The
savings in flight time of the jet aircraft was not a significant factor until routes of
400 to 500 nautical miles were involved. The parties' own figures showed that
over eighty-five percent of the regional transport aircraft flights were less than
400 nautical miles." The Commission concluded from the data that the sub-
stantial difference in acquisition and operating costs was not offset by any
appreciable difference in flight time." Although the passengers might find the
jet and turbo-prop aircraft substitutable, the difference in the acquisition and
operating costs to the purchasing companies would effectively isolate the
products into two distinct markets. Thus, the Commission found that there existed
"no significant overlap of turbo-props and regional jets..'.. Therefore, jet aircraft
were excluded from the relevant product market.
In addition to defining a broad general product market, the Commission may
make a further distinction and recognize in certain cases an actual division of the
relevant product market into a number of individual product groups."' Individual
product groups are identified by a product or small group of products which have
largely identical physical or technical characteristics and are fully inter-
changeable, with the main difference between the products being only a matter
of brand or image or both.' The individual product market is usually
distinguished by classifications used by the undertakings in their marketing
operations.
The Commission in de Havilland cited three distinct individual product
markets within the general regional turbo-prop aircraft market. The Commission
104. Form CO, supra note 56, at § 5.
105. Id.





111. Form CO, supra note 56, at § 5.
112. Id.
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found that the segmentation which realistically reflected the different conditions
of competition in the overall market distinguished regional turbo-prop aircraft
into three separate categories."' Aircraft were divided into groups with twenty to
thirty-nine seats, forty to fifty-nine seats, and sixty seats and over."' The
distinctions were made based upon the replies supplied to the Commission by the
parties in the Form CO, inquiries made by the Commission to customers in the
relevant market, and replies from the parties' competitors 1 5 The individual
product markets were formed on factual assumptions regarding interchangeability
and price!"
6
The Commission used the example that a sixty seat aircraft would not be inter-
changeable with a thirty seat aircraft based on the substantial difference in price
and the fact that the planes would fly routes of significantly different density."
A specific example showed that for the ATR 42 (a forty-eight seat regional turbo-
prop aircraft manufactured by the joint venture entity of Alenia and Aerospatiale),
the strongest competition was from the de Havilland Dash 8-300 (with fifty seats)
and the Fokker 50 (a fifty seat aircraft)."' The parties to the merger attempted to
divide the relevant product market into two aircraft segments of twenty to fifty
seats, and fifty to seventy seats."I The division would have isolated the ATR 42
(forty-eight seats) into a distinct product market from the de Havilland Dash 8-
300 (fifty seats). The Commission evaluated the reality of the consumer
preference in the market and found the overwhelming and controlling opinion to
be that the forty-eight seat aircraft manufactured by the joint venture entity ATR
and the fifty seat aircraft manufactured by de Havilland were interchangeable and
constituted a single individual product market.'2 Thus, the evidence supporting
the relevant product market standard requiring interchangeability and consumer
substitutability by reason of the aircrafts' characteristics, prices, and intended use,
revealed three distinct individual product markets within the relevant regional
turbo-prop aircraft product market.
The U.S. Guidelines focus solely on demand substitution factors, or possible
consumer responses, when defining the relevant market.'2' A relevant market is
defined under the Guidelines as:
A product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is
produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject
113. 1991 OJ. (L 334) at § IV(I 1).
114. Id.
115. Id. § IV(10).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. § IV(13).
119. Id. § IV(15).
120. See id. § IV(12) (providing a full breakdown by the Commission of the competition into three
distinct product markets).
121. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 1.0 (1992).
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to price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of
those products in that area likely would impose at least a 'small but
significant and nontransitory' increase in price, assuming the terms of sale
of all other products are held constant.'
The relevant product and geographic market comprise a group of products and
a geographic area that is no bigger than necessary to satisfy the standard."
The agencies begin their analysis by defining the relevant product market with
respect to each of the products of each of the merging firms. The agencies
evaluate each product produced or sold by each merging firm in terms of what
would happen if a hypothetical monopolist of that product imposed at least a
"small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price, while the terms of sale
of all other products remained constant. 24 If, in response to the increase in price,
reduction in sales of the product would be large enough that a hypothetical
monopolist would not find it profitable to impose such an increase in price then
the product group will be expanded.'25 The agencies consider evidence that
buyers would shift purchases between products or that sellers would base
business decisions on the prospect of buyer substitution between products as a
forecast of buyer reaction to the "small but significant and nontransitory" increase
in price."
The Commission's use of the example of the substitutability for buyers of the
ATR 42 with the de Havilland Dash 8-300 would be alternatively analyzed under
the U.S. Guidelines by conceptually forming a hypothetical profit-maximizing
monopolist, and analyzing the effect of a "small but significant and nontransitory"
increase in price. 27 For the purposes of defining the relevant product market, the
agencies would assume that the price of all other products remained the same.
121
Therefore, it would follow that if the Fokker 50 was substantially in competition
with the other two aircraft, then a "small but significant and non-transitory"
increase in price would presumably cause enough buyers to shift and purchase the
less expensive, yet interchangeable Fokker 50. A shift toward the Fokker 50
would make it unprofitable for the hypothetical profit-maximizing monopolist to
increase the price. Under these conditions, the agency analysis would then include
the Fokker 50 within the relevant product market and would consider the ability
of a hypothetical monopolist producing all three aircraft to profitably increase and
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. § 1.11.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. § 1.11. The Guidelines state that a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price
will vary with the nature of the industry, however, it would most likely fall somewhere around, either above
or below, 5%. Id.
128. Id.
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sustain a higher price without losing such a substantial number of buyers as to
make the increase unprofitable.
The standard, based upon a hypothetical monopolist effecting a profitable price
increase while taking into account the influence of downstream competition faced
by buyers in their output markets, would most likely cause the U.S. agency
evaluating a merger such as the proposed merger in de Havilland to define the
relevant product market as the regional turbo-prop aircraft market, and the
individual group product markets as the three selected by the Commission.129 The
agency would exclude regional jet aircraft from the relevant product market on
the assumption that the "substantially higher" acquisition and operating costs of
the jet aircraft equates to a larger than ten percent difference in cost between the
two aircraft. This would allow a profit-maximizing monopolist in the regional
turbo-prop aircraft market to raise its price five to ten percent and not suffer a loss
of customers to the jet aircraft market. With all relevant factors such as flight
distance and time remaining the same, even with "a small but significant and
nontransitory" increase in the price or the turbo-prop aircraft the purchasers of
regional aircraft would not have enough of an incentive to switch to the higher
priced jet craft.
In addition, the agency would most likely distinguish the regional turbo-prop
aircraft market into the three individual product groups that the Commission
found to exist. The same standard to separate the markets would apply. It is
highly unlikely that a purchaser seeking to buy a twenty to thirty-nine seat aircraft
would switch to a sixty or more seat craft in light of "a small but significant and
nontransitory" increase in price of the smaller aircraft. Even if the acquisition
costs became remotely competitive, the operating costs of flying a sixty seat
aircraft on a route in which there is only twenty-five seat demand would prove
unprofitable to the point at which a profit-maximizing monopolist would be able
to maintain a five to ten percent increase in price in the smaller aircraft product
market. Thus, an analysis of the relevant product market in a case such as de
Havilland would ultimately result in the identical market definition regardless of
whether the E.U. Commission, the DOJ, or FTC were analyzing the case.
The Commission defines the standard for the relevant geographic market as the
area in which the undertakings are involved in the supply of products or services,
in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which
can be distinguished from neighboring areas because, in particular, conditions of
competition are appreciably different in those areas.130 The Form CO cites
relevant factors to distinguish the geographic market: the nature and
characteristics of the products or services concerned, the existence of entry
barriers or consumer preferences, appreciable differences of the undertakings'
129. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text (discussing that the individual product markets
were for 20 to 39 seats, 40 to 59 seats, and 60 seats and higher). Id.
130. See Form CO, supra note 56, § 5.
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market shares between neighboring areas, and substantial price differences. "' The
Commission requires the merging parties to submit price level comparisons for
the three financial years prior to the deal.'32 The comparisons identify the
differences in prices charged by the groups to which the parties belong in each of
the member states and a similar comparison of such price levels charged between
the Union states and their major trading partners.'33
In de Havilland, the Commission held that the relevant geographic market
comprised the world market for regional turbo-prop aircraft exclusive of aircraft
produced in Eastern Europe and China."M Eastern Europe, including the former
Soviet Union and China, was excluded on the basis that the more complex and
expensive certification standards required by Western European and North
American governments at the time, precluded the possibility that these markets
would effectively compete within the world aircraft market.'35
The Commission found no tangible barriers to the importation of the relevant
aircraft from the world market into the European Union and negligible costs of
transportation for delivery. 36 The fact that de Havilland, a Canadian operation,
had a strong market position within the European Union, 37 and ATR, the
European joint venture of Aerospatiale and Alenia, sold thirty-nine percent of its
ATR 42 aircraft in North America, showed significant mutual penetration
between the markets of Europe and North America. 3 Therefore, the Commission
concluded that the geographical market to be taken into account was the world
market excluding Eastern Europe and China.
39
The U.S. standard for the relevant geographic market is stated as the smallest
region such that a hypothetical monopolist that is the only present or future pro-
ducer of the relevant product at locations within that region could profitably
impose a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price, holding
constant the terms of sale for all products produced elsewhere. 4 The evaluating
agency would begin with the location of each merging firm, or each plant of a
multiplant firm, and determine if, in response to the price increase, the reduction
in sales of the product at that location would be large enough that a hypothetical
monopolist producing or selling the relevant product at the merging firm's
location would find it unprofitable to impose the increase in price.' 4 ' The agency
will continue to expand the relevant geographic market until the price increase
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 5(I1)(5.6). For example, the U.S. and Japan are major trading partners of the United States.
1991 OJ. (L 334) at § IV(20).
134. 1991 O.J. (L 334) at § IV(20).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. De Havilland sold 58% of its Dash 8-300 aircraft in the European Union. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 1.21 (1992)
141. Id.
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would prove profitable. The likely reaction of buyers to the price increase will be
gauged by, inter alia: (1) evidence that buyers have or would shift purchases
between locations in response to relative change in price or other competitive
variables; (2) evidence of seller decision-making based upon the possibility of
buyer geographic substitution; (3) downstream competition faced by buyers in
their output markets; and (4) the timing and costs of switching suppliers. 42
The agency evaluating the de Havilland case using the U.S. standard would
most likely define the relevant geographic market for regional turbo-prop aircraft,
as would the Commission, as being the world market excluding Eastern Europe
and China. The aircraft markets in Eastern Europe and China would be excluded
on the factors mentioned. 43 Aircraft buyers would not shift to purchase aircraft
from those markets in response to a "small but significant and nontransitory"
price increase in Western Europe and North America, due to the fact that those
aircraft do not meet western certification standards. 44 Therefore, although the
purchasers within North America or the European Union could buy a less
expensive aircraft, they could not use it within their respective markets.
Conversely, sellers would not be able to sell their aircraft within Eastern Europe
and China due to the fact that the technological sophistication of the aircraft
already places the acquisition costs out of the price range of the purchasers within
those markets. 4 A hypothetical profit-maximizing monopolist would not be able
to establish and maintain any price increase in those markets and therefore, the
markets would fall outside of the relevant geographic markets.
However, the fact that the sellers of the aircraft, such as ATR and de Havilland,
do not have to adjust their prices in light of competition from Eastern Europe and
China, would allow a hypothetical monopolist to profitably effectuate a "small
but significant and nontransitory" increase in price within the world market
exclusive of Eastern Europe and China. The "smallest region" possible to effec-
tuate a change would have to be the world market. The facts show significant
mutual penetration by North American firms in the European Union and by E.U.
firms in the North American market. 46 Thus, if the relevant geographic market
was defined too narrowly, for example the European Union only, then a
hypothetical monopolist (ATR) would not be able to profitably raise its price
within the relevant market without losing sales to competitors outside the market,
such as other manufacturers in North America. Therefore, the relevant geographic
market, as defined by the standard in the Guidelines, would be the world market
for regional turbo-prop aircraft, including North America and the European
Union, excluding Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China.
142. Id.
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C. Market Structure and Market Share
Following a clear definition of the relevant markets in terms of both product
market and geographic area, the Commission will focus on the market structure
of the relevant industry and the position of economic and financial power of the
undertakings concentrating within that industry. The assessment of market
structure identifies the number of firms engaged in competition with the merging
entities and the market share of each of the entities operating within the relevant
market.147 In de Havilland the discussion surrounded the viability of the standard
for calculating market share proposed by the parties submitting notification.'48
The market share standard proposed by Aerospatiale, Alenia, and de Havilland
calculated market shares on the basis of firm orders to date, including all
deliveries to date and orders placed but not yet delivered, for each regional turbo-
prop aircraft type that was being manufactured.'4 9 The method calculated market
share over a broad base and was used generally in the aircraft industry on the
ground that it reflected the competitive position of the manufacturers of the
aircraft in the market in terms of their industrial strength. 5' The measure of
market share in the aircraft industry, which would compete for a limited number
of contracts over an extended period of time, would show substantial distortion
in market share if annual figures were analyzed without regard to a long-term
pattern of orders and deliveries.' The merging parties excluded existing stock
of turbo-prop aircraft still flying but no longer produced, sold, or on the market.
52
The parties successfully argued that technological advances separated the new
generation of aircraft from the old aircraft, which were discontinued but still in
operation. 
53
The parties were almost able to convince the Commission to include in the
market share options taken out for future purchases of aircraft. Options to buy air-
craft that were not yet fully in service could be placed by airlines as insurance to
preserve the possibility of actually ordering the aircraft in the later stages. 15 The
debate focused on the fact that options were not a sufficiently reliable indicator
of market strength on account of the ease in which they could be, or later were,
canceled.' The key to the successful conversion of options into firm orders
relied upon the technical performance of the initial planes in the market.'
56
Although the conversion rates of options to orders could be evaluated historically,
147. Id. § IV(3),





153. Id. § IV(22).
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the changing nature of the market and continuous advance of technological
sophistication made overall customer requirements unclear and therefore the
.conversion rate of options to orders a contested issue.157
The Commission calculated the market shares of each of the competitors in the
three relevant individual group product markets for all new-technology generation
regional turbo-prop aircraft first on the basis of firm orders to date.'58 In order to
obtain an overall view of the impact of the concentration on the entire turbo-prop
aircraft industry, the Commission calculated market shares by aggregating the
three relevant product markets defined in the decision.'59 To adjust for the weight
in value of the different sized planes, the number of firm orders was multiplied
by the standard number of seats for each type of aircraft."6 The calculations
provided an estimated market share for both the world market and the E.U.
market for regional turbo-prop aircraft.1
6'
The results of the calculation of market shares on the basis of firm orders to
date showed that in the relevant product market of forty to fifty-nine seats, the
new entity of ATR and de Havilland would obtain roughly sixty-four percent
market share in the world market and a seventy-two percent market share in the
Union. 6 In the relevant product market of sixty seats and above, the new entity
would obtain a market share of seventy-six percent in the world market and
seventy-four percent market share in the Union. The calculation of the overall
regional turbo-prop aircraft market estimated that the concentration of ATR and
de Havilland would acquire a worldwide share of fifty percent of the overall
turbo-prop aircraft market of twenty to seventy seats, and a sixty-five percent
market share within the Union."6
Analysis of market structure and market share within the European Union is
conducted using the industry standard available that accurately reflects the com-
petitive position of the manufacturers of the aircraft in the relevant market in
terms of their industrial strength. 6 The United States calculates market shares
using a slightly different standard. The Guidelines calculate the market shares of
firms identified as market participants based on the total sales capacity currently
devoted to the relevant market together with that which likely would be devoted
to the relevant market in response to a "small but significant and nontransitory"
price increase."6 The market shares will be calculated using the best indicator of
157. Id.
158. Id. § IV(23).
159. Id. § IV(25).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. § IV(26).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. § IV(21).
166. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 1.41 (1992).
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firms' future competitive significance. 67 Either dollar sales, shipments, unit sales,
physical capacity or reserves will be used to calculate a firm's market share,
depending upon which measure most effectively distinguishes the firms in the
relevant market.
6 3
On point with the de Havilland case, the Guidelines state that where individual
sales are large and infrequent so that annual data may be unrepresentative, the
agency involved may measure market shares over a longer period of time.'
69
Therefore, due to the fact that the analysis of annual data of dollar sales and
deliveries in the regional turbo-prop aircraft market would distort the actual
market reality, the agency evaluating the proposed merger would have used
figures that covered a longer time period in the calculation of the market share.
The U.S. analysis of market share might differ from that of the Commission by
the fact that the Commission in its final analysis relied upon market share figures
that recognized only firm orders to date. 7 ' The "best indicator of firms' future
competitive significance" could involve a final analysis which includes both firm
orders to date and options to buy aircraft in the future. The parties would have to
convince the agency to overcome the conclusion reached by the Commission that
options are an unreliable indicator of market strength of a manufacturer because
they can be easily canceled.' An assumption by the evaluating agency of the cal-
culation of market share, "on a forward looking basis," might cause the agency
to include options, and thus the underlying assumptions of the market shares cal-
culated by the Commission could be dramatically different in a U.S. jurisdiction.
Assume, however, for the purposes of further analysis, that the U.S. agency
evaluating the proposed merger calculated the market shares exactly as the
Commission on the basis of firm orders to date.
D. Market Concentration
Following the calculation of market shares of the proposed concentration, the
Commission turned to an analysis of the impact of the concentration within the
relevant market. The Commission analyzed the impact of the proposed con-
centration in de Havilland in six related areas. The Commission evaluated: (1) the
effect of the concentration on ATR's market position; (2) the production range
of turbo-prop aircraft the concentration would acquire; (3) the broadening of the
customer base of the new entity; (4) the elimination of de Havilland as a
competitor; (5) an assessment of the remaining competition; and (6) an
assessment of customer position in relation to the new entity.'72
167. Id. at n.15. The agencies state, "[w]here all firms have, on a forward-looking basis, an equal
likelihood of securing sales, the Agency will assign firms equal shares." Id.
168. Id. § 1.41.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
171. 1991 O.J. (L 334) 5 at § IV(24).
172. Id. § IV(28)-(50).
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The Commission, evaluating the effect of the concentration on ATR's market
position, concluded that the proposed concentration would significantly
strengthen ATR's position in the regional turbo-prop aircraft market. 73 The Com-
mission cited the high combined market share in both the forty to fifty-nine seat
market and the overall twenty to seventy seat market. 174 ATR, after the merger,
would increase its share of the overall world market for regional turbo-prop
aircraft of forty to fifty-nine seats from forty-six percent to sixty-three percent. 175
The closest competitor, Fokker, would have approximately one-third of ATR's
share at only a twenty-two percent market share. 76 In addition, ATR would have
a seventy-six percent market share in the world market for aircraft with sixty or
more seats. These figures posed a serious threat to competition within the Union
on the ground that the central trend in the E.U. aircraft market was toward the
purchase of larger aircraft on account of the increasing airport fees, crowded
skies, and limited airport capacities.'" The Commission relied upon evidence that
showed that by the end of 1990, eighty-four percent of the total seat capacity
ordered in the European Union was for planes with forty seats or higher.1 8 These
figures, in addition to the fact that the postmerger ATR would increase its overall
worldwide market share of aircraft of sixty seats and over to seventy-six percent
and its worldwide market share of aircraft with twenty to seventy seats from
thirty-three percent to fifty percent, 179 raised serious anticompetitive concerns for
the Commission regarding the impact on market concentration of the merger in
the relevant market."I
Once the relevant product and geographic markets have been defined and the
market shares of all market participants have been calculated, the U.S. agency
evaluating the proposed merger will use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index [HHI]' 8 '
to calculate postmerger market concentration."2 The HHI measures both the num-
ber of firms in a market and their market shares, and gives greater weight to the
market shares of the largest firms in the market. This properly reflects the leading
roles which such firms are likely to play in an exercise of market power. Market
concentration is a function of the number of firms in a market and their respective
market shares. The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual
market shares of all the participants.'83






179. Id. This is equivalent to roughly two and one half times its closest competitor- Saab with 19%.
Id.
180. Id.
181. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 1.5.
182. Id.
183. Id. (calculating (a) 2+(b)2+(c)2=HHl, where a, b, and c represent market shares of each market
participant).
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The postmerger HHI in de Havilland, where the new entity acquired a fifty
percent market share in the overall worldwide market for aircraft with twenty to
seventy seats and the nearest competitor Saab maintained a nineteen percent
market share (assuming six other competitors with roughly five percent market
share each), would be 3011.t" The difficulty with calculating the overall market
concentration, however, is the fact that different competitors maintain widely
varying market shares within each of the three distinct relevant product markets,
distinguished by the type of aircraft according to the number of seats. In such a
situation, the U.S. agency would most likely calculate the HHI for each individual
product market and determine on a separate basis the concentration of the market
and possible anticompetitive effects of a merger within each market. Depending
upon the postmerger market concentration, these calculations could bring forth
a preliminary approval based on a "fix-it-first" divestiture order 85 for the sector
where the market was highly concentrated and the merger posed significant
anticompetitive concerns.
The Guidelines classify postmerger HHI figures into three categories: below
1000, between 1000 and 1800, and above 1800. " A postmerger HHI below 1000
would reflect a highly fragmented atomistic market in which the proposed merger
would be unlikely to have adverse anticompetitive effects. An agency would
normally approve the proposed merger and conduct no further analysis once an
HHI below 1000 was calculated. 7
A postmerger HHI between 1000 and 1800 demonstrates a moderately
concentrated market. When the postmerger HHI rises above 1000, the evaluating
agency conducts a second calculation that determines the difference between the
premerger HHI and the postmerger HHI. 88 If the difference in market
concentration is less than 100 then the agency will find that the proposed merger
is unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and will ordinarily conduct no
further analysis." 9 However, if the change in market concentration exceeds 100,
the agency will consider the proposed merger as raising serious anticompetitive
concerns and will further evaluate the merger in terms of competition, entry,
efficiencies, and failing firm defenses.' g
A calculation above 1800 evidences a highly concentrated market where any
increase in the HHI of more than fifty points would invoke further analysis of the
above factors. An increase of more than 100 would automatically give rise to a
presumption that the proposed merger is likely to create or enhance market power
184. See id.(calculating (50)2+ (I9)2+ [(5)2 x 6] = 3011).
185. See RowIEY & BAKER, supra note 22, at 489-90 (discussing the DOJ policy of "fix-it-first" before
problematic mergers are completed).
186. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 1.5 (1992).
187. Id. § 1.51(a).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 1.51(b).
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and adversely affect competition within the relevant market. 9' The agencies will
challenge a merger that has a postmerger HHI over 1800 with an increase of more
than 100 points. t9 The de Havilland case, analyzed in terms of a premerger HHI
of 1889193 and postmerger HHI of 3011, would unquestionably be challengedby
either agency evaluating the proposed merger. An increase of over 1000 points
provides an excellent example of the function of the HHIL.
When two competitors with a substantial market share attempt to merge in the
same relevant market, the concentration of the market expands exponentially. By
squaring the market shares of each individual participant, the HHI gives much
greater weight to higher market shares. Thus, in the case of de Havilland, where
the market shares of the remaining six participants are. all relatively small in the
overall market, it is not crucial to calculate their exact market share on account
that a small market share does not substantially affect the overall HHI. However,
when two market participants with a large market share attempt to merge, for
example ATR at thirty-three percent, and de Havilland at seventeen percent, the
HHI reflects over a 1000 point change in the market concentration. The
substantial change in the market concentration of well over 100 points alerts the
agency evaluating the merger. In a case such as de Havilland the agency would
immediately contact the parties and put them on notice that any attempted merger
would be challenged. Absent a qualified showing of highly beneficial efficiencies,
extreme ease of entry, or valid proof of the failing firm defense, the merging
parties would bear the insurmountable burden of overcoming a presumption that
the proposed merger would have substantial anticompetitive effects within the
relevant market.
E. Remaining Factors
The Commission recognized that the post-concentration entity of ATR and de
Havilland would have roughly a fifty percent market share of the overall world
market of aircraft with twenty to seventy seats and nearly two and a half times the
market share of its nearest competitor Saab (with a nineteen percent market
share). 94 The higher combined market share might further increase after the
merger on the ground that the new entity could compete more effectively with the
smaller competitors by offering flexibility on price and financing. The larger sales
base of the concentration would allow it to offer a better price than competitors
on a certain aircraft when selling a number of planes in the different seat
191. Id. § 1.51(c).
192. Id. The merging entities may overcome the presumption of anticompetitive effects by proving that
the merger is unlikely to create or enhance market power through the arguments available to the merging
entities, for example, difficulty of collusive action, firm efficiencies, or the failing firm defense. This was one
of the major changes between the old separately issued merger guidelines and the new revised version. Id.
§§ 2-5.
193. This calculation is (33) 2+(19) 2+(17f+[(5)2 x 6] =1889.
194. 1991 OJ. (L 334) at § IV(29).
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categories to the same purchaser. The comparative number of sales of the
concentration would also allow it to offer customers better financing rates than
the competition. In a mixed deal where it would sell two aircraft of thirty and
sixty seats, the new entity of ATR and de Havilland could offer special conditions
for the purchase of the ATR 72 (sixty seats) when it is sold in combination with
a Dash 8-100 (thirty-six seats). When there would exist more competition in the
thirty seat market, the new entity of ATR and de Havilland could leverage its
market position by offering a discount in the less competitive sixty seat market
that would allow it to lock in sales in the more competitive market. Thus, over
time, the concentration's market position would increase beyond the calculated
fifty percent overall market share.'95
The Commission also analyzed the broadening of the customer base of the new
entity in light of the increased production range of aircraft that the new entity of
ATR and de Havilland would acquire.' 6 Post-concentration, the new entity of
ATR and de Havilland would be the only regional turbo-prop aircraft
manufacturer present in all of the three individual product markets. 97 The
inability of a manufacturer to offer a full range of seating capacities under the
same umbrella could harm the demand for other existing aircraft of that
manufacturer. Fixed costs of pilot and mechanic training, maintaining different
in-house parts inventories for different aircraft, and costs of dealing with several
manufacturers when ordering parts stocked only by the individual manufacturers,
combine to provide a strategic competitive advantage to a manufacturer that could
offer a full range of aircraft across the entire relevant product market." 8
The full production range of the combined entity would also bring together the
customer base of both ATR and de Havilland. Premerger statistics showed that
ATR maintained forty-four customers worldwide and de Havilland delivered
aircraft to thirty-six customers. 99 The closest competitors, Saab and Fokker, have
only twenty-seven and twenty operating airline customers, respectively.2 ' The
customer base is an important element in market power for aircraft manufacturers
on account of a lock-in effect to the manufacturer, once the initial choice of
aircraft has been made. Evidence produced from customer inquiries by the
Commission showed that there are relatively high costs involved in switching
from one aircraft to another based upon the fixed costs related to varying
technology, pilot and maintenance training, and spare parts.20' The Commission
concluded that the merged entity would most likely maintain its combined
195. See id. § IV(30).
196. Id. § IV(33).
197. Id. § IV(32).
198. Id.
199. Id. § IV(33).
200. Id.
201. Id.
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customer base of eighty operating airline customers, and that with the full range
of regional turbo-prop aircraft, it would expand that base in the future.2 2
The merger of ATR and de Havilland would effectively remove de Havilland
as a competitor in the regional turbo-prop aircraft market. In terms of aircraft
sold, de Havilland was the most successful competitor of ATR. De Havilland
ranked second in the forty to fifty-nine seat category in terms of backlog of orders
with seventy-two orders for the Dash 8-300, while ATR led the field with 103
orders for the ATR 42.' In addition, de Havilland was planning to develop a new
aircraft to compete directly against ATR in the sixty seat and over market in
which ATR maintains a seventy-six percent market share. Elimination of de
Havilland as a competitor through the proposed concentration would have
effectively removed ATR's strongest competitor and concentrated the two
manufacturers into one market entity. As a defense to the Commission's findings
of the elimination of competition and concentration of the market structure, the
merging parties attempted to argue that if the merger was not consummated, de
Havilland would in the medium to long term be phased out by Boeing and
eliminated as a competitor.205 The Commission stated flatly, "without prejudice
as to whether such a consideration is relevant pursuant to Article 2 of the Merger
Regulation, the Commission considers that such elimination is not probable. ' 2c"
Although the defense of a failing firm is questionable as it relates to Article 2
of regulation 4064/89, the failing firm or failing division defense is clearly
available to merging entities in the United States. Section 5.1 of the Guidelines
articulates a four part test: (1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet
its financial obligations in the near future; (2) the firm would not be able to
reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act;2 7 (3) the firm
has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers of
acquisition that would keep both its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant
market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed
merger; and (4) absent the acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the
market.' A similar argument based on concrete evidence of elements one, three,
and four can be made on behalf of a failing division.20 9 De Havilland was a
division of Boeing and therefore the parties had to show a negative cash flow on
an operating basis, in addition to elements three and four, for de Havilland to
meet the failing division defense.
The Commission cited a pre-acquisition review conducted for Aerospatiale and
Alenia which showed that de Havilland produced high quality, well known and
202. Id.




207. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74(1988).
208. See 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 5.1 (1992).
209. Id.
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highly respected products, the net selling prices of which had been increasing
steadily.10 The decision focused on the fact that there was no likelihood that de
Havilland, in the absence of the proposed merger, would be phased out." In
addition, British Aerospace, a competitor with a relatively insignificant overall
market share of four percent, had also expressed an interest in purchasing de
Havilland. 2 Under these circumstances, the U.S. agency evaluating the proposed
merger would most likely find that the merging entities failed to meet the
elements necessary to assert a successful failing division defense.
Following the impact analysis regarding market concentration, production
range, customer base, and elimination of competition, the Commission assessed
the current and expected future strength of the remaining competition to
determine whether the new combined entity would be able to act independently
of its competitors. 23 The Commission divided competition into two groups,
namely, medium-sized specialists and those that belonged to large groups in
which the regional turbo-prop aircraft formed a relatively small amount of their
overall aerospace activity.1 The evaluation of both groups showed that the
effective competition for the combined entity would only be maintained in the
market of twenty to thirty-nine seat commuters, and even in the small market,
ATR/de Havilland would have a further advantage in light of its full production
range and broad base of customers.2 5 Apart from limited competition from Saab,
the Commission concluded that it was questionable whether the other existing
competitors could provide effective competition in the medium to long term in the
forty seat and higher aircraft market.
21 6
The combined strength of the concentration, given the relative weakness of
competition, brought the Commission to further evaluate the concentration in
terms of the ability of the concentration to act independently from the
consumer.2"7 The Commission evaluated the position of the customers in the
regional turbo-prop aircraft market to ultimately determine if the proposed merger
would effectively create or strengthen a dominant position of the new entity of
ATR and de Havilland within the Union in violation of Article 2 of Merger
Regulation 4064/89."' Potential customers were divided into established airlines,
new airlines, and leasing corporations. Established airlines that had already
purchased ATR or de Havilland planes were viewed as locked-in customers with
relatively weak bargaining positions on account of the relatively high costs of
210. 1991 O.J. (L 334) at § IV(31).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. § IV(34).
214. Id. § IV(35).
215. Id. § IV(42).
216. Id.
217. Id. § IV(43).
218. 1990 O.. (L 257) at art. 2.
320
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selection of a different manufacturer.219 New airlines or those replacing an entire
fleet of aircraft were viewed as having a slightly better negotiating position.220
However, new airlines often leased aircraft to minimize risk exposure to long
term ownership and virtually all of the airlines seeking to replace their fleets in
the near future had already contracted with the existing parties and had no
immediate plans to expand further.2"'
The leasing companies that offer a bridge for market entrants placed their
orders for aircraft without knowledge of where or to whom the aircraft would be
leased. The Commission found that the companies mainly purchased aircraft that
were the best established on the market in order to avoid leasing problems which
would leave the companies with extra stock of unpopular products. 22 The
decision of many leasing companies to buy either ATR or de Havilland 22 aircraft
based upon popularity, product range, technical strengths, record of innovation,
and marketing support, placed the companies in a dependent relationship with
ATR and de Havilland. Thus, after analysis of customer replies to Commission
inquiries, the Commission concluded that the new entity could act to a significant
extent independently of both its competitors and customers, and would therefore
have a dominant position in the relevant market as defined
24
The U.S. merger analysis regarding the impact of the merger on consumers is
generally limited to the supply-side analysis of potential market substitution in
response to changes in consumer demand.2 Nevertheless, market share
projections may be relied upon to demonstrate that a significant share of sales will
be accounted for by consumers who would be adversely affected by the merger
if three conditions are met.226 First, market concentration data must fail outside
the safe harbor regions.227 Second, the merging firms should have a combined
market share of at least thirty-five percent.2m Third, data on product attributes and
relative product appeal should show that a significant share of purchasers of one
merging firm's product regard the other as their second choice.2 29 Based on the
facts in de Havilland, the U.S. agency evaluating the proposed merger would
clearly rely upon the market share data to demonstrate that the proposed merger
would adversely affect a significant share of consumers.
219. Id. § IV(33).
220. Id. § IV(46).
221. See id. § IV(47).
222. Id.
223. Id. § IV(51).
224. Id.
225. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 1.0 (1992).
226. Id. § 2.211.
227. See supra note 184. In this case, ATR/de Havilland would fall well outside the safe harbor regions
with a postmerger increase of over 1000 to gin HHI of3011. Id.
228. 1991 O.J. (L 334) at § IV(26). ATR/de Havilland had a 50% combined overall market share. Id.
229. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 2.211 (1992). ATR had 103 backlog orders for its 48 seat plane and de
Havilland was a strong second with 72 orders for its 50 seat plane. 1991 OJ. (L 334) at § IV(31).
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F Market Entry and Technical or Economic Progress
The arguments, recognized by both the European Union and the United States
to overcome the burden of the finding of a dominant position or the presumption
of anticompetitive effects, are potential market entry and economic progress,
referred to in the U.S. Guidelines under Entry Analysis210 and Efficiencies. 3'
The E.U. Commission stated clearly in de Havilland that:
In general terms, a concentration which leads to the creation of a dominant
position may however be compatible with the common market within the
meaning of Article 2(2) of the Merger Regulation if there exists strong
evidence that this position is only temporary and would be quickly eroded
because of high probability of strong market entry.
2
Market entry in the European Union is evaluated with regard to the forecast of
future demand and the time and cost considerations to enter the market.
3
The forecast for regional turbo-prop aircraft regarding an increase in market
demand for annual deliveries was estimated by the parties to have already reached
maturity at the time of the proposed concentration.M The industry expected the
current demand for aircraft to be maintained only into the mid-1990s, and the esti-
mates projected that the demand would thereafter stabilize and decline. 5 Studies
submitted by the parties revealed that there were substantial fixed and sunk costs
of entering the regional aircraft market and considerable delays in designing,
testing and gaining regulatory approval to sell the aircraft. 6
The magnitude of the initial sunk development costs of the aircraft constituted
a significant risk associated with full commitment to a particular type of aircraft.
If the entering manufacturer erred in designing and producing an aircraft that did
not meet market demand, the initial sunk costs were not recoverable. In addition,
the time necessary to adequately research future market demand, design and
develop an aircraft to meet that demand, and deliver the aircraft to the ultimate
consumer, was estimated to be six to seven years. 237 Given the fact that market
estimates projected that future demand for aircraft was expected to stabilize and
decline at the exact time a potential entrant would be entering the market, the
Commission concluded that it would not be rational for a new manufacturer to
enter the regional aircraft market.238 Thus, the probability that a new market
230. 57 Fed Reg. 41552 § 3 (1992).
231. Id. §4.
232. 1991 O.J. (L 334) at § IV(53).
233. Id. § IV(54).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. § IV(55).
237. Id. Note that this figure does not include time to acquire or to build plant production facilities. Id.
238. Id. § IV(57).
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entrant would assume the risk, the sunk costs, and the time commitment to the
production of a new aircraft was highly unlikely and insufficient to overcome the
presumption against the creation of a dominant position by the merging entities.
U.S. analysis concerning potential entry focuses on the standard that a merger
is not likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise if entry
into the market is so easy that market participants, after the merger, either
collectively or unilaterally, could not profitably maintain a price increase above
premerger levels. 9 Entry is considered easy if entry would be: (1) timely; (2)
likely; and (3) sufficient in its magnitude, character and scope to deter or
counteract the anticompetitive effects of the profit-maximizing merged entity with
market power.24 With regard to the timeliness of entry, the evaluating agency
will consider only those committed entry alternatives that can be achieved within
two years from initial planning to significant market impact.24 Potential entry in
de Havilland required a minimum of six to seven years and therefore would most
likely be considered untimely by an evaluating agency.
Entry is considered likely if it would be profitable at premerger prices and if
such prices could be secured by the entrant.242 A minimum viable scale is used to
calculate the smallest annual average level of sales that the committed entrant
must persistently achieve for profitability at premerger prices 34' Three factors
listed in the Guidelines that would reduce the sales opportunities available to
entrants and would discourage the likelihood of entry, are directly on point with
de Havilland. First, a potential entrant in the regional turbo-prop aircraft market
would share in a reasonably expected decline in market demand as the aircraft
market stabilized and declined from the mid-1990s forward.24 Second, a potential
entrant would be excluded from a portion of the market over the long term, due
to forward contracting and the lock-in purchasing with incumbent manu-
facturers.245 Third, potential entrants would face difficulty in achieving market
acceptance in a product market where commitment to purchase is influenced
heavily by the suppliers' past performance and reputation.246 These factors, in
addition to the significant sunk costs and risk of commitment to production,
would most likely have led the evaluating agency to reject any argument that
239. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 3.0 (1992).
240. Id.
241. Id. § 3.2.
242. Id. § 3.3.
243. Id.
244. Id. at n.31. Note 31 states:
The minimum viable scale of an entry alternative will be relatively large when the fixed
costs of entry are large, when the fixed costs of entry are largely sunk, when the
marginal costs of production are high at low levels of output, and when a plant is
underutilized for a long time because of delays in achieving market acceptance.
Id.
245. 1991 OJ. (L 334) at § IV(33).
246. Id.
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entry in the regional turbo-prop market was likely to occur after the
consummation of the proposed merger.
Sufficiency of entry to the relevant market is calculated on the basis of those
committed entrants who are likely to enter the market?47 Generally, if market
entry is likely, then it will be considered sufficient to counteract the anti-
competitive effects of the merged entity. It logically follows that where market
entry is not likely, sufficiency never becomes an issue. Thus, in de Havilland the
question of the sufficiency of market entry would be considered a moot point
once the agency evaluating the merger acknowledged that entry into the regional
turbo-prop aircraft market was neither rational, nor likely at the time of or soon
after the proposed merger.
In closing, the Commission in de Havilland evaluated the possible tech-
nological and economic justifications cited as the final factor for analysis in
Article 2(l)(b) of the Merger Regulation 4064/89.24 The merging parties argued
that one of the central objectives in the acquisition of de Havilland was cost
reduction.249 The Commission rejected the claim on the ground that the reduction
in costs through better management, marketing, and product support would
amount to only one half of a percent of the combined turnover.' 0 In addition,
ATR had established an excellent position in the regional turbo-prop market and
had maintained efficient production management."' Therefore, ATR did not need
to obtain (by acquisition) further capacity or market share in order to guarantee
its long term success as a major player in the worldwide regional turbo-prop
aircraft industry. 2 The Commission concluded that the combination of
productive capacities, combined with a market share large enough to wage a price
war which could effectively eliminate the closest competitors of the merged
entity, outweighed any benefit in technological advance the parties could obtain
in the market. 3 Thus, the Commission ruled that the economic or technological
advances were insufficient to withstand a challenge based upon the establishment
of a dominant position within the relevant market5' 4
As a parallel to the Commission's discussion on technical and economic
progress, the U.S. Guidelines also cite efficiencies as a possible justification for
a proposed merger which might raise serious anticompetitive concerns.?5
Efficiencies which can increase the competitiveness of firms and result in lower
prices to consumers are viewed as beneficial by the agencies. However, the
bottom line in the evaluation of efficiencies examines whether the merging firms
247. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 3.1 (1992).
248. See 1990 OJ. (L257) at art. 2(1)(b).
249. Id.
250. 1991 OJ. (L334) at § IV(65).
251. Id.
252. Id. § IV(67).
253. Id. § IV(69).
254. Id.
255. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552 § 4 (1992).
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could achieve equivalent or comparable efficiencies through other less anti-
competitive means.1 6 In addition, the expected net efficiencies must increase in
proportion to the increase in the competitive risks posed by the proposed merger.
The justifications proposed by the merging entities with regard to reduction in
costs through production integration and improved management and marketing
would almost certainly be viewed by the agency evaluating the merger as out-
weighed by the significant anticompetitive concerns the new entity would pose
in the regional turbo-prop aircraft market. Thus, a U.S. agency would most likely
follow the E.U. Commission's ruling and would declare that the proposed merger
of ATR and de Havilland would raise serious anticompetitive concerns without
sufficiently valid efficiency justifications. The agency ultimately charged with the
evaluation would notify the merging parties that the proposed merger was pro-
hibited. In light of all of the competitive standards reviewed, the agency in a case
such as de Havilland would have built a strong argument under the Guidelines to
successfully challenge the proposed merger in the appropriate forum.
IV. CONCLUSION
By all standards of analysis under Article 2 of E.U. Merger Regulation
4 0 64/89,'7 the proposed concentration of the undertakings of Aerospatiale and
Alenia (ATR) with de Havilland would have created and strengthened a dominant
position for the concentration within the overall world market and the European
Union market for regional turbo-prop aircraft of twenty to seventy seats. Thus,
in the absence of valid justifications, the proposed concentration, which could
ultimately have lead to a monopoly by ATR, was declared incompatible with the
common market and blocked by the Commission
Under U.S. standards the proposed merger would most likely have brought
forth a challenge from either the FTC or DOJ. The agency evaluating the merger
would probably have cited the substantial increase in the HHI, from an already
highly concentrated suspect premerger level of 1889 to a postmerger level of
3011, as the most important factor showing both the significant increase in market
concentration and anticompetitive possibilities of the merged entity. An increase
in the HHI of over fifty points, from any premerger level of over 1800, brings the
merger out of the safe harbor guidelinesu 9 The 1122 point increase in
concentration would have created a strong presumption against the merger and
would have shifted the burden of proof to the merging parties. To overcome the
anticompetitive presumption, the merging parties might have argued either the
Market Entry defense,2'6 significant procompetitive Efficiencies defense,26 or
256. Id.
257. 1991 O.J. (L257).
258. 1991 O.J. (L334) at § 1V(72).
259. 57 Fed Reg. 41552 § 1.5 1(c) (1992).
260. Id. § 3.
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Failure and Exiting Assets defense.262 Nevertheless, the facts did not strongly
support any of the three major defenses and most likely the merger would have
been successfully challenged as a merger that facilitated the acquisition and main-
tenance of market power in the regional turbo-prop aircraft market.
The greatest similarities in the comparison of E.U. and U.S. horizontal merger
policy enforcement were found in the assessment of the relevant geographic and
product market,263 the analysis of the impact of the concentration on the market
(in terms of structure and remaining competition),' and in the market entry and
efficiencies defense standards. 265 The most significant differences between the
guidelines existed in the definition of market concentration and the United
States use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to assess the extent of change of
concentration within the relevant market. 7 In addition, the calculation of market
share, based in the European Union on current industrial strength and in the
United States upon future competitive significance, separated further the possible
conclusions on the change in market concentration and the anticompetitive impact
the merger would have upon the relevant market.
2 6
Whether the European Union recognizes the failing division defense industry
remains questionable and the limited U.S. assessment of the consumer bargaining
position in the market after the merger, represent two areas where U.S. and E.U.
analysis of market impact slightly diverge. Nevertheless, these differences are
insignificant in relation to the similarity of the overall comparison of policy
objectives and evaluation standards employed by each side. The continued
evolution of antitrust development in the respective jurisdictions demonstrates the
fact that although the analytical framework of merger enforcement grows more
complex over time, the conceptual tools used to consider the impact of a proposed
international horizontal merger are in fact, quite similar across transnational
boundaries.
261. Id. § 4.
262. Id. § 5.
263. See supra notes 102-146 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 147-171 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 194-229 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 172-193 and accompanying text.
267. Id.
268. See supra notes 147-171 and accompanying text.
